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OPINION
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SMITH, Circuit Judge.
This appeal tests the limits of the
good faith requirement applicable to
petitions filed under Chapter 11 of the
B a n k r u p t c y  C o d e .   A p p e l l a n t
NMSBPCSLDHB, L.P. (the “Landlord”)
appeals from an order of the District Court
affirming the Bankruptcy Court’s denial of
its motion to dismiss for lack of good faith.
The Landlord contends that the Debtor,
Integrated Telecom Express,  Inc.
(“Integrated”), was never in financial
distress and that the petition in this case
was instead filed to frustrate the Landlord’s
claims and to increase the distribution of
the Debtor’s estate to Integrated’s
shareholders at the Landlord’s expense.
These contentions are corroborated by the
record.  First, according to schedules filed
with the Bankruptcy Court, Integrated had
$105.4 million in cash and $1.5 million in
other assets at the time that it filed for
bankruptcy, and yet the Landlord’s proof of
claim lists the present discounted value of
Integrated’s  lease  obl iga t ions at
approximately $26 million.  Integrated’s
schedules also list miscellaneous liabilities
of approximately $430,000.  Thus
Integrated was highly solvent and cash rich
at the time of the bankruptcy filing.  Even
if the IPO class action claim, which was
capped at $25 million with Integrated’s
liability limited to a $5 million reserve (the
balance to be paid by insurance) was listed
at its full alleged value, Integrated was still
solvent at the time of filing.  Second, in a
smoking gun resolution approved by the
Board, and notwithstanding its strong
financial position, Integrated authorized a
letter to the Landlord threatening that if it
did not enter into a settlement of the lease
in the amount of at least $8 million,
Integrated would file for bankruptcy so as
to take advantage of § 502(b)(6), which
3sharply limits the amount that a landlord
can recover in bankruptcy for damages
resulting from the termination of a lease.  
The issue on appeal is whether, on
the facts of this case, a Chapter 11 petition
filed by a financially healthy debtor, with
no intention of reorganizing or liquidating
as a going concern, with no reasonable
expectation that Chapter 11 proceedings
will maximize the value of the debtor’s
estate for creditors, and solely to take
advantage of a provision in the Bankruptcy
Code that limits claims on long-term
leases, complies with the requirements of
the Bankruptcy Code.  We conclude that
such a petition is not filed in good faith and
will therefore reverse. 
I.
Integrated was a supplier of
software and equipment to the broadband
communications industry.  In the summer
of 2000, Integrated negotiated a lease of
real property in Silicon Valley with the
Landlord.  After several months of
negotiation, during which the Landlord
evaluated Integrated’s business condition
and reviewed the company’s prospectus,
Integrated and the Landlord executed a
lease for a term of ten years beginning on
February 23, 2001, with a monthly base
rent of $200,000, increasing 5 percent
annually.  The Landlord was aware of the
financial risks associated with Integrated’s
business and willingly accepted those risks.
2001 was a very poor year for
Integrated.  The market for many of the
company’s products deteriorated, causing
Integrated to suffer net losses of $36.2
million.  Integrated hired a management
and technology consulting firm in
December 2001 to help evaluate
Integrated’s operating alternatives.
Integrated also retained Lehman Brothers,
an investment bank, in February 2002, to
assist in identifying, soliciting, and
evaluating proposals for a sale or merger of
Integrated or its assets.  Unable to find a
third party willing to enter into such a
transaction, and unable to identify an
alternative business model, Integrated’s
Board of Directors prepared a plan for the
liquidation and dissolution of the company
under state law.
In November 2001, a securities class
action styled Richmon v. Integrated
Telecom Express, Inc., No. 01-CV-10108-
SAS, was filed in the Southern District of
New York naming Integrated as a
defendant, along with certain officers,
directors, and underwriters of Integrated.
The class consists of individuals who
purchased Integrated stock between August
18, 2000, and December 6, 2000.  The
class action alleges claims in the amount of
$93.24 million for various violations of the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 in connection with
Integrated’s initial public offering of
securities.  Similar lawsuits concerning
more than 300 other companies’ initial
public offerings have been filed and
coordinated as In re Initial Public Offering
Securities Litigation, No. 21-MC-00092-
SAS (S.D.N.Y.).    
On April 18, 2002, Integrated’s
Board approved a Plan of Complete
Liquidation and Dissolution under
4Delaware law.  The two major issues to be
resolved prior to dissolution were (1) the
disposition of Integrated’s intellectual
property rights and (2) its remaining
obligations under the lease.  In May of
2002, the Board approved the sale of
substantially all of Integrated’s intellectual
property and related assets to Real Com, a
corporation to be formed by certain of
Integrated’s officers and directors.  The
proposed purchase price was $1.5 million
plus assumption of Integrated’s technical
support and warranty obligations. 
Thereafter, Integrated attempted to
negotiate an accord and satisfaction of its
lease.  Integrated asserts that, “[d]uring this
time, Debtor first became aware that it
might use Chapter 11 to, among other
things, address Landlord’s claims.”
Appellee’s Br. at 6-7.  On August 13,
2002, the Board authorized a Chapter 11
filing in the event that the Landlord would
not accept $8 million as an accord and
satisfaction of Integrated’s obligations
under the lease.  The minutes of the August
13 Board meeting state, in pertinent part:
Mr. Regel [Integrated’s
CEO] updated the Board on
his discussions with the
landlord subsequent to the
last board meeting.  Mr.
Regel noted that the landlord
did not appear to believe that
t h e  C o m p a n y  w o u ld
seriously consider making a
bankruptcy filing.  
Ms. Murray [of the law firm
Murray & Murray] next
reviewed with the Board the
draft letter to the landlord (a
c o p y o f  w h ic h  w as
previously distributed to the
Board).
Ms. Murray then reviewed
with the Board the timeline .
. . for a bankruptcy filing and
r e l a t e d  b a n k r u p t c y
procedures.
Various members of the
Board then asked questions
of Ms. Murray related to the
draft letter to the landlord
and the procedures for, and
implications of, a possible
bankruptcy filing by the
Company.  A discussion
among the Board ensued,
including a discussion of the
costs and potential benefits
and risks of proceeding with
a bankruptcy filing.
Following that discussion,
Mr. Regel asked the Board
f o r  a u t h o r i t y  f o r
management to negotiate a
settlement with the landlord
in an amount in the range of
$6 to $7 million.  A further
discussion among the Board
ensued regarding the costs
associated with a bankruptcy
filing and potential costs of
any l i tigation.  After
additional discussion, the
B o a r d  a p p r o v e d  t h e
following resolutions:
5RESOLVED:  That the
officers of the Company are,
and each of them hereby is,
authorized and directed to
send the landlord the letter
prepared by Murray and
Murray in substantially the
form reviewed with the
Board.
RESOLVED FURTHER:
That the officers of the
Company are, and each of
them hereby is, authorized
and directed to negotiate a
settlement with the landlord
up to a maximum settlement
amount of $7 million.
RESOLVED FURTHER:
That the Board hereby
appoints . . . a special
c o m m i t t e e  ( t h e
“Committee”) that is hereby
empowered on behalf of the
Board to authorize the
officers of the Company to
enter into a settlement with
the landlord up to a
maximum settlement amount
of $8 million. 
RESOLVED FURTHER:
That the officers of the
Company shall be required
to seek approval from the
Board prior to entering into
an [sic] settlement with the
landlord in excess of $8
million. 
RESOLVED FURTHER:
That the officers of the
Company be, and each of
them hereby is, authorized
and directed to instruct
bankruptcy counsel to begin
to prepare the necessary
paperwork for a bankruptcy
filing. 
RESOLVED FURTHER:
That if the landlord is not
willing to enter into a
settlement agreement with a
maximum amount of $8
million, then the officers of
the Company shall be, and
each of them hereby is,
authorized and empowered
on behalf of, and in the
name of, the Company to
execute and verify or certify
a petition under Chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code and
to cause the same to be filed
in the appropriate United
States Bankruptcy Court
(the “Bankruptcy Court”) at
such time as said authorized
officer executing the same
shall determine.  
On August 15, 2002, Integrated’s
bankruptcy counsel sent the Landlord a
letter stating that, if the Landlord was
unwilling to settle, the Debtor was
prepared to avail itself of various
provisions in the Bankruptcy Code,
including the cap on landlords’ claims set
6forth in 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(6).1  The letter asserted that “even if [Integrated]
were to file bankruptcy solely to cap the
Lessor’s claim using Bankruptcy Code §
502(b)(6), a use for which this Code
section is intended, [Integrated] would not
violate the good faith filing doctrine.”  
No settlement was reached.
Proceedings in the Bankruptcy
Court
 Integrated filed a voluntary petition
for relief under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code on October 8, 2002.
According to schedules filed with the
Bankruptcy Court, Integrated had $105.4
million in cash and $1.5 million in other
assets at the time that it filed for
bankruptcy.  The Landlord filed a proof of
claim listing the present discounted value
of Integrated’s lease obligations at
approximately $26 million.  Integrated’s
schedules also list miscellaneous liabilities
of approximately $430,000.
Immediately after Integrated filed
its petition, Integrated attempted to address
    1  11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(6) limits the
amount that a landlord can recover in
bankruptcy for damages resulting from
the termination of a lease.  Under §
502(b)(6), a landlord can recover rent that
has accrued as of the filing of the
petition, but may not recover rent
remaining on the lease beyond one year’s
rent or 15 percent of the remaining rent
(not to exceed three years), whichever is
greater:  
(a)  A claim or interest, proof of which is
filed under section 501 of this title, is
deemed allowed, unless a party in interest
. . . objects.
(b) . . . if such objection to a claim is
made, the court, after notice and a
hearing, shall determine the amount of
such claim in lawful currency of the
United States as of the date of the filing
of the petition, and shall allow such claim
in such amount, except to the extent
that— 
. . . 
(6) if such claim is the claim of a lessor
for damages resulting from the
termination of a lease of real property,
such claim exceeds— 
(A) the rent reserved by such lease,
without acceleration, for the greater of
one year, or 15 percent, not to exceed
three years, of the remaining term of such
lease, following the earlier of— 
(i) the date of the filing of the petition;
and
(ii) the date on which such lessor
repossessed, or the lessee surrendered,
the leased property; plus
(B) any unpaid rent due under such lease,
without acceleration, on the earlier of
such dates . . . .
7the two major obstacles to dissolution:  the
sale of its intellectual property assets and
its remaining obligations under the lease.
On October 9, 2002, the day after
Integrated filed its petition, Integrated
moved to sell its intellectual property assets
at a public auction.  The Official
Committee of Equity Security Holders (the
“OCESH”) objected to the adequacy of
Integrated’s efforts to market the assets.
Ultimately, Integrated was able to
renegotiate the sale and to introduce other
bidders.  As a result, a new agreement was
reached with Real Com for some, but not
all, of the assets for $2 million, an increase
of $500,000.  The remaining assets were
sold for $500,000 after confirmation of the
plan of reorganization.
Also on October 9, 2002, Integrated
moved to reject the lease.  The Landlord
opposed the motion and, on October 28,
2002, filed a motion to dismiss the Chapter
11 proceeding on the ground that the
petition was not filed in good faith.  On
January 8, 2003, the Bankruptcy Court
conducted an evidentiary hearing on the
motion to dismiss and the motion to reject
the lease during which it heard evidence
regarding Integrated’s decision to file for
Chapter 11.  After the close of evidence,
the Bankruptcy Court determined that oral
argument was unnecessary and denied the
motion to dismiss from the bench. 
The Bankruptcy Court explained at
the hearing that Integrated “offered a
number of reasons for the filing of the
bankruptcy case,” and that the court
“believe[d] there is validity to a number of
those considerations.”  The court, however,
did not expand on this statement except to
stress that Integrated “was losing a lot of
money.”  The court characterized the
company’s financial losses as “dramatic.”
According to the court, Integrated “was
experiencing a dramatic downward spiral”
in September 2001.  As such, the court
concluded that “the Board had an
obligation, and appropriately exercised
that obligation, to give the investors their
money back.”
Alternatively, the Bankruptcy Court
held  that, “even assuming” that
Integrated’s stated reasons for filing the
petition were not “particularly persuasive,”
Integrated’s desire to take advantage of the
§ 502(b)(6) cap on landlords’ claims was
not a sufficient basis on which to dismiss
the petition “as a matter of law”:
But even assuming that
those other factors are not
particularly persuasive, even
assuming or accepting the
l a n d l o r d ’ s  p o s i t i o n ,
particularly illustrated by the
Board of Directors’ minutes
of August 13 of ‘02, that the
principal reason for the
Chapter 11 case was to cap
the damage claim for the
landlord, I conclude that as
a matter of law, that is not a
debilitating fact. I held in
[In re PPI Enterprises
(U.S.), Inc., 228 B.R. 339
(Bankr. D. Del. 1998), aff’d,
324 F.3d 197 (3d Cir.
2003)], and other cases have
held, that it does not
8establish bad faith for a
debtor to file a chapter 11
case for the purpose of
t a k i n g  a d v a n t a g e  o f
provisions wh ich alte r
pre-petition rights, including
altering the rights of a
landlord under State law. 
The Bankruptcy Court was guided
by the following proposition:  “[A]s the
case law clearly indicates, not limited to
my case [referring to the Bankruptcy
Judge’s decision in PPI], the solvency of
the debtor and the fact that the equity
interest holders will receive a distribution
does not serve as the basis for a finding of
bad faith.”  The court thus saw no
significance in the fact that the § 502(b)(6)
cap would operate solely to the benefit of
equity holders, as opposed to creditors:
What I think is also
significant in this case is that
. . . this debtor had no
significant debt. . . . 
The difference in this
case is that the company was
not at all leveraged.  And if
the distribution were, for the
most part, or totally to go to
the creditors, there would be
no basis for the landlord to
complain regarding some
equitable principle.
But I don’t think the
Code makes any distinction.
And I think that the—why
this case is different is
because the debtor simply
was not leveraged.  And
instead of the significant
distribution going to debt
holders . . . it’s going to go
to the shareholders.  
The Bankruptcy Court then went on to
discuss “other decisions that agree with
that proposition, namely that a solvent
debtor can avail itself of the 502(b)(6)
cap,” focusing in particular on In re
Sylmar Plaza, L.P., 314 F.3d 1070 (9th
Cir. 2002), and characterizing Sylmar as
“almost on all fours with the situation
before me.” 
With respect to the equities of the
case, the Bankruptcy Court found that,
although the shareholders would realize a
“benefit” from the bankruptcy in the form
of a “significant distribution,” “the
shareholders are not coming out whole by
any means.”  The court concluded that
“obviously you can’t consider that they
[i.e., the shareholders] are being treated
[to] any windfall.”  Conversely, the court
found that the Landlord elected to “ride
with the bulls,” when it entered into the
lease with Integrated, and that, as a
“sophisticated individual” who “took the
risk [hoping] that his instincts were right,”
he must “suffer the consequences” of his
instincts being wrong.  On January 30,
2003, the Bankruptcy Court issued an
order formally denying the motion “for the
reasons stated on the record at the
Hearing.” 
The Bankruptcy Court  Confirm s
Integrated’s Plan of Liquidation
The Bankruptcy Court held a
9confirmation hearing on April 7, 2003, and
issued an order confirming Integrated’s
proposed plan of liquidation over the
Landlord’s objections on April 16, 2003.
Applying § 502(b)(6), the Landlord’s claim
was reduced from $26 million to $4.3
million.
The plan of liquidation did not
completely resolve the securities class
action.  Instead, the plan reserved $5
million of the debtor’s estate to satisfy any
judgment that might be entered in the
securities class action.  When added to $20
million in insurance coverage available to
Integrated, the plan effectively limited any
potential judgment in the securities class
action to $25 million.  The securities class
voted in favor of the plan of liquidation.
The Landlord appealed to the
District Court and moved the Bankruptcy
Court to stay confirmation of the plan
pending appeal.  The Bankruptcy Court
addressed the Landlord’s motion for a stay
at an April 29, 2003 hearing.  The
Bankruptcy Court reaffirmed its earlier
ruling on the Landlord’s motion to dismiss,
making several “observations to amplify
the record on the issue.”  Specifically, the
Bankruptcy Court elaborated on the
significance of the securities class action:
There is nothing in the law
t o  s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e
corporation cannot avail
itself to the distribution
scheme set forth in the
B a n k r u p t c y C o d e  i n
effecting that liquidation.  In
that regard, it’s also worth
noting that [this] Chapter 11
case had the effect on the
securities law plaintiffs
similar to its effect on this
landlord.  It effectively
reduced the recovery by the
securities law claimants by
t r e a t i n g  t h e m  l i k e
shareholders pursuant to
Section 510(b).[2]
Could the securities
law plaintiffs obtain a bad
faith ruling in this case?  I
don’t think so for essentially
the same reasons I think that
the landlord cannot.
With respect to the
securities law action, I am
puzzled to understand how
that claim could be resolved
in a non-bankruptcy law
liquidation context absent a
final resolution of that
claim.  In a non-bankruptcy
law context, the securities
law plaintiffs would have
    2  11 U.S.C. § 510(b) subordinates
claims for damages arising from the
purchase or sale of a security of the
debtor to all claims and interests that are
senior or equal to the claim or interest
represented by such security.  Where, as
here, the security is common stock, the
claim has the same priority as common
stock.  Collier on Bankruptcy §§ 510.01,
510.04[1] (15th ed. 2004).
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had a  very s t rateg ic
advantage, namely so long as
there  was a  possible
r e c o v e r y  aga in s t  t h e
corporation, the liquidation
would be stalled indefinitely.
The Bankruptcy Court also
commented on Integrated’s financial
affairs leading up to its decision to file for
Chapter 11:
THE COURT:  Are you
saying that Integrated
Telecom is a healthy
company?
MR. HAZELTINE:  Your
Honor, Integrated Telecom
as it sits here today is a very
healthy company.  At the
t im e  i t  e n t e r e d  fo r
bankruptcy it was a very
healthy company.  They
had— 
THE COURT:  They’re out
of business, aren’t they?
MR. HAZELTINE:  They’re
out of business.  But their
balance sheet looks great.
They have $105 million in
assets, $28 million in debts if
the landlord’s claim is not
capped.
They could become
an investment company,
invest that money and
make—make money.  They
just—
THE COURT:  Well,
I—they could.  But I believe
they would be in breach of
their fiduciary duty if they
did, and I made this
observation back in January.
The Bankruptcy Court nevertheless stayed
its confirmation order pending appeal, on
the condition that the Landlord post a $2.5
million bond.
Appeal to the District Court
The District Court affirmed,
holding that the Bankruptcy Court did not
abuse its discretion in denying the
Landlord’s motion to dismiss.  The District
Court concluded that the Bankruptcy Court
made two specific findings of fact: (1) that
in September 2001 the Debtor was in
“financial distress”; and (2) that the Board,
consistent with its fiduciary responsibility,
properly pursued liquidation in order to
fulfill its obligations to its investors.   The
District Court did not disturb either
finding.
The District Court understood the
Bankruptcy Court to have alternatively
ruled, as a matter of law, that “even if the
Debtor’s principal reason for filing its
Chapter 11 case was to cap the Landlord’s
damage claim, that alone was insufficient
to establish bad faith.”  The District Court
concluded that the Bankruptcy Court’s
legal ruling “was based on a sound
interpretation of relevant case law from
this and other jurisdictions, and does not
constitute an abuse of discretion.”  The
District Court rejected the Landlord’s
argument that “permitting a solvent
11
corporation to invoke the landlord cap
would permit an end run around a core
principle of bankruptcy law, the ‘absolute
priority rule’—that is, that creditors must
be paid in full before stockholders can
retain equity interests for any purpose.”
Like the Bankruptcy Court, the District
Court observed that insolvency is not a
prerequisite to filing under Chapter 11.
Regardless, in light of the Bankruptcy
Court’s finding that Integrated was
“experiencing a dramatic downward spiral”
and that filing a Chapter 11 petition
fulfilled the Board’s obligations to
shareholders, the District Court concluded
that no such “end run” had taken place.
Although the District Court affirmed the
Bankruptcy Court’s ruling, the District
Court extended the Bankruptcy Court’s
stay of the confirmation order.  
The Landlord filed a timely appeal
from the District Court’s order.  We
expedited the appeal and stayed the
Bankruptcy Court’s confirmation order
pending the appeal.  Jurisdiction in the
District Court was proper under 28 U.S.C.
§ 158(a), and we exercise jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d).  Although this
Court’s jurisdiction is over the decision of
the District Court, 28 U.S.C. § 158(d),
“review of the District Court’s decision
effectively amounts to review of the
bankruptcy court’s opinion in the first
instance.”  In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of
Del., 298 F.3d 219, 224 (3d Cir. 2002).  
II.
Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions are
subject to dismissal under 11 U.S.C. §
1112(b) unless filed in good faith, and the
burden is on the bankruptcy petitioner to
establish that its petition has been filed in
good faith.   In re SGL Carbon Corp., 200
F.3d 154, 159-62 (3d Cir. 1999); accord
Solow v. PPI Enters. (U.S.), Inc. (In re PPI
Enters. (U.S.), Inc.), 324 F.3d 197, 211 (3d
Cir. 2001) (“The debtor bears the burden
of establishing good faith.”).3  Whether the
good faith requirement has been satisfied
is a “fact intensive inquiry” in which the
court must examine “the totality of facts
and circumstances” and determine where
a “petition falls along the spectrum
ranging from the clearly acceptable to the
patently abusive.”  Id. at 162.  We
therefore review for abuse of discretion the
Bankruptcy Court’s refusal to dismiss a
Chapter 11 petition for want of good faith.
Solow v. PPI Enters. (U.S.), Inc. (In re PPI
Enters. (U.S.), Inc.), 324 F.3d 197, 211 (3d
Cir. 2003).  “[A]n abuse of discretion
exists where the district court’s decision
    3  Under 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b), “the
court may convert a case under [Chapter
11] to a case under Chapter 7 . . . or may
dismiss a case under this chapter,
whichever is in the best interest of
creditors and the estate, for cause.”  The
statute lists 10 non-exhaustive factors
that may amount to cause.  H.R. Rep. No.
95-595, at 406 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.S.C.A.N. 5963, 6362 (“[The] list
[contained in § 1112(b) ] is not
exhaustive. The court will be able to
consider other factors as they arise, and
to use its equitable powers to reach an
appropriate result in individual cases.”). 
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rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of
fact, an errant conclusion of law, or an
improper application of law to fact.”  SGL
Carbon, 200 F.3d at 159 (quoting ACLU v.
Black Horse Pike Reg’l Bd. of Ed., 84 F.3d
1471, 1476 (3d Cir. 1996)).  
At its most fundamental level, the
good faith requirement ensures that the
Bankruptcy Code’s careful balancing of
interests is not undermined by petitioners
whose aims are antithetical to the basic
purposes of bankruptcy:  
“[A good faith standard]
furthers  the balan cing
process between the interests
of debtors and creditors
which characterizes so many
provisions of the bankruptcy
laws and is necessary to
legitimize the delay and
costs imposed upon parties
t o  a  b a n k r u p t c y .
Requirement [sic] of good
faith prevents abuse of the
bank ruptcy process by
debtors whose overriding
motive is to delay creditors
without benefitting them in
any way . . . .” 
SGL Carbon, 200 F.3d at 161-62 (quoting
Little Creek Dev. Co. v. Commonwealth
Mortgage Corp. (In re Little Creek Dev.
Co.), 779 F.2d 1068, 1072 (5th Cir. 1986));
see also Carolin Corp. v. Miller, 886 F.2d
693, 698 (4th Cir. 1989) (good faith
requirement is “indispensable to proper
accomplishment of the basic purposes of
Chapter 11 protection”).  The Supreme
Court has identified two of the basic
purposes of Chapter 11 as (1) “preserving
going concerns” and (2) “maximizing
property available to satisfy creditors.”
Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v.
203 N. LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434,
453 (1999); accord Toibb v. Radloff, 501
U.S. 157, 163-64 (1991) (discussing “the
congressional purpose of deriving as much
value as possible from the debtor’s
estate”).  Each of these purposes informs
our application of the good faith
requirement:
“Review and analysis of
[the bankruptcy laws and
relevant cases] disclose a
c o m m o n  t h e m e  a n d
objective [underlying the
reorganization provisions]:
a v o i d a n c e  o f  t h e
consequences of economic
d i s m e m b e r m e n t  a n d
l iq u i d a t io n ,  and  t h e
preservation of ongoing
values in a manner which
does equity and is fair to
rights and interests of the
parties affected.  But the
perimeters of this potential
mark the borderline between
fulfillment and perversion;
between accomplishing the
objectives of rehabilitation
and reorganization, and the
use of these statutory
provisions to destroy and
undermine the legitimate
rights and interests of those
intended to benefit by this
13
statutory pol icy.  That
borderline is patrolled by
courts of equity, armed with
the doctrine of ‘good faith’ .
. . .”
SGL Carbon, 200 F.3d at 161 (quoting In
re Victory Constr. Co., Inc., 9 B.R. 549,
558 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981), order stayed
Hadley v. Victory Constr. Co., Inc. (In re
Victory Constr. Co., Inc.), 9 B.R. 570
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981)); see also Marsch
v. Marsch (In re Marsch), 36 F.3d 825, 828
(9th Cir. 1994) (“The test is whether a
debtor is attempting to unreasonably deter
or harass creditors or attempting to effect a
speedy, efficient reorganization on a
feasible basis.”); United Sav. Ass’n of Tex.
v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd.
(In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs.,
Ltd.), 808 F.2d 363, 373 (5th Cir. 1987) (en
banc) (stating that if Chapter 11 plan does
not have a rehabilitative purpose, the
“statutory provisions designed to
accomplish the reorganization objective
become destructive of the legitimate rights
and interests of creditors, the intended
beneficiaries”); Connell v. Coastal Cable
T.V., Inc. (In re Coastal Cable T.V., Inc.),
709 F.2d 762, 764 (1st Cir. 1991) (Breyer,
J.) (stating that there must be “some
r e l a t i o n — a t  l e a s t  a n  a r g u a b le
relation—between the chapter 11 plan and
the reorganization-related purposes that the
chapter was designed to serve”).  
Our cases have accordingly focused
on two inquiries that are particularly
relevant to the question of good faith:  (1)
whether the petition serves a valid
bankruptcy purpose, e.g., by preserving a
going concern or maximizing the value of
the debtor’s estate, and (2) whether the
petition is filed merely to obtain a tactical
litigation advantage.  SGL Carbon, 200
F.3d at 165.
It is easy to see why courts
have required Chapter 11
petitioners to act within the
scope of the bankruptcy
laws to further a valid
reorganizational purpose.
Chapter 11 vests petitioners
w i t h  c o n s i d e r a b l e
powers—the automatic stay,
the exclusive right to
propose a reorganization
plan, the discharge of debts,
etc .— that can impose
significant hardship on
particular creditors.  When
f i n a n c i a l l y  t r o u b l e d
petitioners seek a chance to
remain in business, the
exercise of those powers is
justified.  But this is not so
when a petitioner’s aims lie
outs ide those of the
Bankruptcy Code.
Id. at 165-66.4  Likewise, “because filing a
    4  In SGL Carbon, we used the phrase
“a valid reorganizational purpose”
because that case involved a plan of
reorganization.  See SGL Carbon, 200
F.3d at 167.  Reorganization, however, is
not the only “appropriate use of Chapter
11 since the Code clearly contemplates
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Chapter 11 petition merely to obtain tactical litigation advantages is not within
‘the legitimate scope of the bankruptcy
laws,’ courts have typically dismissed
Chapter 11 petitions under these
circumstances as well.”  Id. at 165
(quoting In re Marsch, 36 F.3d at 828); see
also Furness v. Lilienfield, 35 B.R. 1006,
1013 (D. Md. 1983) (“The Bankruptcy
provisions are intended to benefit those in
genuine financial distress. They are not
intended to be used as a mechanism to
orchestrate pending litigation.”).
A.
As the Bankruptcy C ourt
recognized, Integrated is unquestionably
“out of business,” and therefore has no
going concern value to preserve in Chapter
11 through reorganization or liquidation
under the Bankruptcy Code.  The question
therefore becomes whether Integrated’s
pe t i ti on migh t  r easonably have
“maximiz[ed] the value of the bankruptcy
estate.”  Toibb, 501 U.S. at 163; accord
203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 453.  For the
reasons that follow, we conclude that it
would not.
To say that liquidation under
Chapter 11 maximizes the value of an
entity is to say that there is some value that
otherwise would be lost outside of
ba nk ru ptcy.   E l izabe th  W arren ,
Bankruptcy Policymaking In an Imperfect
World, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 336, 350 (1993)
(“Two empirically based economic
assumptions underlie the attempt to
preserve the value of a failing company:
(1) orderly liquidation is likely to produce
more value—or to avoid more loss—than
liquidating plans under 11 U.S.C. §
1123(b)(4), whereby a debtor may
develop a Chapter 11 plan to sell off all
of its assets.”  PPI, 324 F.3d at 211;
accord 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(4) (“[A] plan
may . . . provide for the sale of all or
substantially all of the property of the
estate, and the distribution of the
proceeds of such sale among holders of
claims or interests . . . .”).  Yet liquidation
plans, no less than reorganization plans,
must serve a valid bankruptcy purpose. 
That is, they must either preserve some
going concern value, e.g., by liquidating a
company as a whole or in such a way as
to preserve some of the company’s
goodwill, or by maximizing the value of
the debtor’s estate.  
We therefore reject the OCESH’s
argument that the good faith inquiry
applies with less force to liquidation
plans because, since ownership is not
allowed to retain an interest in the
reorganized entity, the potential for bad
faith is reduced.  The good faith
requirement is necessitated as much by
the hardship of Chapter 11 to certain
interests as it is by the benefit to others. 
SGL Carbon, 200 F.3d at 161-62, 165-66. 
Moreover, the facts of this case
demonstrate the fallacy of the OCESH’s
argument.  While the owners of
Integrated may never recover the full
value of their investments, they stand to
reap a substantial gain through
bankruptcy, at the expense of the
company’s sole creditor. 
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piecemeal liquidation; and (2) going-
concern value is likely to be higher than
liquidation value.”); Collier on Bankruptcy
¶ 1108.12 (“[W]here liquidation is
appropriate, the Code contemplates orderly
liquidation and not a ‘fire sale.’”).  At its
most basic level, the Bankruptcy Code
maximizes value by alleviating the problem
of financial distress.  See Thomas H.
Jackson, The Logic and Limits of
Bankruptcy Law 10 (1986) (“The basic
problem that bankruptcy law is designed to
handle, both as a normative matter and as
a positive matter, is that the system of
individual creditor remedies may be bad
for the creditors as a group when there are
not enough assets to go around.”).  As
Integrated conceded at oral argument, good
faith necessarily requires some degree of
financial distress on the part of a debtor.
See SGL Carbon, 200 F.3d at 166 (“Courts,
therefore, have consistently dismissed
Chapter 11 petitions filed by financially
healthy companies with no need to
reorganize under the protection of Chapter
11.” (emphasis added)); Coastal Cable,
709 F.2d at 765 (“To meet the ‘good faith’
requirement . . . many courts have held that
a reorganization plan must bear some
relation to the statutory objective of
resuscitating a financially troubled
corporation.” (emphasis added));  Baker v.
Latham Sparrowbrush Assocs. (In re
Cohoes Indus. Terminal, Inc.), 931 F.2d
222, 228 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Although a
debtor need not be in extremis in order to
file such a petition, it must, at least, face
such financial difficulty that, if it did not
file at that time, it could anticipate the need
to file in the future.”); In re Dixie Broad.,
Inc., 871 F.2d 1023, 1027 (11th Cir. 1989)
(recognizing that one factor relevant to
good faith is “whether the debtor is
‘financially distressed’” and affirming
dismissal of petition for, inter alia , use of
bankruptcy proceedings despite the
apparent good financial health of the
debtor”); Little Creek, 779 F.2d at 1072
(“Determining whether the debtor’s filing
for relief is in good faith depends largely
upon the bankruptcy court’s on-the-spot
evaluation of the debtor’s financial
condition, motives, and the local financial
realities.”);  In re The Bible Speaks, 65
B.R. 415, 424-26 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986)
(concluding that, despite the absence of a
statutory financial eligibility standard in
Chapter 11, “[t]he legislative history [to
the Bankruptcy Code] indicates that
Congress intended Chapter 11 to be
resorted to by business entities which are
experiencing some type of financial
difficulty”); In re Talladega Steaks, Inc.,
50 B.R. 42, 44 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1985)
(dismissing petition where debtor
“presented no evidence that financial
difficulties had precipitated the filing of
the petition and indeed testified that the
debtor’s debts and other financial
obligations were substantially current”).
To be sure, a debtor need not be
insolvent before filing for bankruptcy
protection.  SGL Carbon, 200 F.3d at 163-
64.  
[T]he drafters of the
B a n k r u p t c y  C o d e
understood the need for
early access to bankruptcy
relief to allow a debtor to
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rehabilitate its business
before it is faced with a
hopeless situation.  Such
encouragement, however,
does not open the door to
premature filing, nor does it
allow for the filing of a
bankruptcy petition that
l a c k s  a  v a l i d
reorganizational purpose.
SGL Carbon, 200 F.3d at 163 (footnote
om itted); see also,  e .g . ,  In  re
Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 727, 736
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (“Accordingly, the
drafters of the Code envisioned that a
financially beleaguered debtor with real
debt and real creditors should not be
required to wait until the economic
situation is beyond repair in order to file a
reorganization petition.”).  Saying that
there is no insolvency requirement,
however, does not mean that all solvent
firms should have unfettered access to
Chapter 11.  Despite the absence of an
express financial eligibility requirement in
the Code,5 SGL Carbon emphatically
rejected any such proposition:
Courts, therefore, have
c o nsis ten t ly d is m is sed
Chapter 11 petitions filed by
f i n a n c i a l l y  h e a l t h y
companies with no need to
reo rgan ize under  t he
protection of Chapter 11.
T h o s e  c o u r t s  h a v e
recognized that  i f  a
petitioner has no need to
rehabilitate or reorganize, its
petition cannot serve the
rehabilitative purpose for
which Chapter 11 was
designed.  
SGL Carbon, 200 F.3d at 166 (citations
omitted).  Accordingly, the absence of a
solvency requirement recognizes that even
solvent firms can, at times, suffer from
financial distress.  Id. at 163 (early access
for solvent debtors designed to preempt “a
hopeless situation”); In re Marshall, 300
B.R. 507, 512-13 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2003)
(“It is not uncommon for debtors to be
solvent under the balance sheet test, and
yet to have severe financial problems. . . .
The United States bankruptcy law is
designed to provide relief from creditor
pressures for debtors with cash flow
difficulties, even where they are clearly
solvent under a balance sheet test.”).  
 Both the Bankruptcy Court and the
District Court concluded that Integrated
faced financial distress because it “was
losing a lot of money,” and “was
experiencing a dramatic downward spiral”
in September 2001, and that, as a result,
Integrated had gone “out of business.”  We
do not see how bankruptcy offers
Integrated any relief from this sort of
distress, which has no relation to any debt
owed by Integrated.  That is, we can
identify no value for Integrated’s assets
that was threatened outside of bankruptcy
    5  Integrated unquestionably meets the
express statutory requirements for
eligibility to file a Chapter 11 petition. 
11 U.S.C. § 109(d); The Bible Speaks, 65
B.R. 415 at 424-25.
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by the collapse of Integrated’s business
model, but that could be preserved or
maximized in an orderly liquidation under
Chapter 11.  Because Integrated’s
“dramatic downward spiral” does not
establish that Integrated was suffering from
financial distress, it does not, standing
alone, establish that Integrated’s petition
was filed in good faith.
Creditors that fear an impending
default may seek to protect their claims,
triggering “the chaotic mix of self-help
repossession and judicial execution
available at state law” to which the
Bankruptcy Code provides an alternative.
Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking, 92
Mich. L. Rev. at 350.  The absence of an
insolvency requirement encourages
companies to file for Chapter 11 before
they face a financially hopeless situation.
SGL Carbon, 200 F.3d at 163-64.  Yet this
is decidedly not the case here.  The
Bankruptcy Court recognized the
unquestionable reality that “the debtor
simply was not leveraged” and, apart from
the Landlord’s claim, “had no significant
debt.”  JA34-35.  The court’s conclusion
that “I don’t think the Code makes any
distinction” is legal error.    
The absence of any financial
distress facing Integrated distinguishes the
two principal cases relied on by the
Bankruptcy Court and the District Court.
In PPI, an insolvent debtor defaulted on a
lease with approximately $5.86 million in
rent remaining on the lease.  324 F.3d at
200-01.  The debtor’s Chapter 11 petition
purported to serve two main purposes:  (1)
liquidating the debtor’s sole asset, namely,
$12.6 million in stock in Del Monte Food
Co., free of restrictions that would
otherwise have limited its value to $1.6
million; and (2) limiting the landlord’s
lease termination damages under §
502(b)(6).  Id. at 201 & n.5.  The debtor
was successful on both fronts.  The Del
Monte stock was sold at a court-approved
auction for $11 million, id. at 201 n.5, and
the landlord’s lease claim was capped at
$100,000, id. at 207.
Critically, the debtor in PPI claimed
to have been insolvent.  In addition to the
landlord’s claims, the debtor had
unsecured claims of approximately $54.6
million, dwarfing the value of its only
asset, the Del Monte stock.  PPI, 228 B.R.
at 343.  The landlord in PPI objected to
these claims because the debt was owed to
insiders of the debtor, namely, the debtor’s
parent companies.  The landlord argued
that these insider claims should be
recharacterized as equity interests, which
would leave the debtor solvent by
approximately $11 million (not including
the landlord’s claim).  Id. at 345.  This
issue, however, was not raised on appeal,
and we proceeded on the assumption that
the debtor “owed 50 million in ‘inter-
company debt.’”  PPI, 324 F.3d at 200 n.3.
Accordingly, PPI stands fo r the
proposition that an insolvent debtor can
file under Chapter 11 in order to maximize
the value of its sole asset to satisfy its
creditors, while at the same time availing
itself of the landlord cap under §
502(b)(6). 
We likewise understand In re
Sylmar Plaza, which the  Bankruptcy
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Court considered “almost on all fours with
the situation before me,” to be a case in
which Chapter 11 was used to maximize
value for creditors.   The debtors in Sylmar
Plaza owned a shopping center that was
subject to a secure loan from the bank.
The debtors experienced “cash flow
problems” and ultimately defaulted on the
loan.  314 F.3d at 1072-73.  Bankruptcy
allowed the debtor to sell the shopping
center free and clear of the bank’s lien,
which sale the Bankruptcy Court found to
be in the best interest of the estate and all
of its creditors.  Id. at 1073; Supp. App. at
114 (Order Authorizing Sale of Real
Property Free and Clear of Liens at 4, In re
Sylmar Plaza, No. LA-99-33188-AA
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 1999)).  
The bank did not appeal the sale
order.  Sylmar Plaza, 314 F.3d at 1073.
Instead, the Bank appealed from the
confirmation of the debtor’s plan of
reorganization, which took advantage of a
provision in the Bankruptcy Code to
calculate the bank’s claim according to the
regular interest rate, rather than the default
interest rate.  Id.  In particular, the bank
objected to the fact that “the plan leaves
the [debtors] solvent while permitting them
to avoid paying post-petition interest at the
default interest rate.”  Id. at 1074.   
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the
lower court’s finding of good faith,
reasoning that (1) insolvency is not a
prerequisite to a finding of good faith, and
(2) the fact that a creditor’s contractual
rights are adversely affected does not by
itself warrant a bad faith finding.  Id. at
1074-75.  The court’s holding, however,
cannot be divorced from the facts of that
case, which reveal that the Bankruptcy
Code was used to maximize value for
creditors as a whole.  Moreover, although
the debtors appear to have come out
solvent in Symlar Plaza, there is no
indication that they would have come out
solvent had the bank’s claim not been
limited, or that solvency was a foregone
conclusion when the petition was filed.  
In contrast, as noted above and
detailed below, according to schedules
filed with the Bankruptcy Court,
Integrated had $105.4 million in cash and
$1.5 million in other assets at the time that
it filed for bankruptcy, and yet the
Landlord’s proof of claim lists the present
discounted value of Integrated’s lease
obligations at approximately $26 million.
In tegra ted’s  sche dules  a lso l is t
miscellaneous liabilities of approximately
$430,000.  Thus Integrated was highly
solvent and cash rich at the time of the
bankruptcy filing.  Even if the IPO class
action claim, which was capped at $25
million with Integrated’s liability limited
to a $5 million reserve (the balance to be
paid by insurance) was listed at its full
alleged value, Integrated was still solvent
at the time of filing. 
In light of the foregoing, we
conclude that the collapse of Integrated’s
business model does not support a finding
of good faith.  Integrated was not suffering
financial distress when it filed its petition,
and the rulings of the Bankruptcy Court
and the District Court to the contrary
constitute legal error.  The failure of
Integrated’s business did not subject the
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company to any pressure on the value of its
assets that could be reduced or avoided in
an orderly liquidation under Chapter 11.
Because Integrated’s economic difficulties
do not establish that Integrated was
suffering from financial distress, they do
not, standing alone, establish that
Integrated’s petition was filed in good
faith.
B.
On appeal, Integrated argues that its
petition served a valid bankruptcy purpose
because bankruptcy “provide[d] a
framework for the Debtor to resolve the
Securities Class Action.”  Appellee’s Br. at
8.  In this regard, the Bankruptcy Court
made no findings that are entitled to
deference.  Instead the Bankruptcy Court
merely acknowledged that Integrated
“offered a number of reasons for the filing
of the bankruptcy case,” and that the court
“believe[d] there is validity to a number of
those considerations.”  (Emphasis added).
“[A] number of those considerations”
necessarily is less than all of those
considerations, and the Bankruptcy Court
did not identify which particular
considerations had merit except to stress
that Integrated “was losing a lot of money.”
Moreover, colloquially at least, stating that
“there is validity to” something is not the
same as saying that something is valid.  
Nevertheless, Integrated bore the
burden of demonstrating good faith, and
there is no evidence in the record from
which a finding of good faith could be
made based on the pending securities class
action.  There is no question, for example,
that the securities class action did not place
Integrated in financial distress.  When it
filed its petition, Integrated had assets of
nearly $107 million (of which $105
million was cash).  Integrated also had
Directors and Officers (“D&O”) insurance
coverage of $20 million.  Although the
securities class claimed $93 million,
Integrated concedes in its brief that it
“believed that the Securities Claim would
be settled, likely within policy limits [i.e.,
for less than $20 million].”  Appellee’s Br.
at 33.  In documents filed with the SEC,
including a proxy statement issued in
anticipation of a vote on Integrated’s Plan
of Complete Liquidation and Dissolution
under Delaware law, Integrated stated:  
The company believes that
the claims against it are
without merit and intends to
d e f e n d  t h i s  l a w s u i t
vigorously.  While the
outcome of these claims is
currently not determinable,
the Company does not
expect that the ultimate
costs to resolve these claims
will have a material adverse
effect on the Company’s
financial position, results of
operations or cash flows.
James G. Regel, Integrated’s CEO,
testified that the above statement was true
when the proxy statement was filed.
Integrated offers no argument that
circumstances surrounding the securities
class action changed between April of
2002, when the Board resolved to liquidate
under state law, and October of that year,
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when the Board decided to file under
Chapter 11.  
In the end, Integrated’s predictions
proved accurate.  The securities class
ultimately voted in favor of a plan of
liquidation that capped their claims at $25
million.   Although the plan does not
resolve the securities claims, it limits
Integrated’s liability for the securities class
action to a $5 million reserve.  The
securities class action will go forward, but
the class has essentially capped its recovery
at $25 million (the $5 million reserve plus
the $20 million D&O policy).  The
inescapable conclusion from the record is
that the securities class action did not
threaten any value of Integrated that
Chapter 11 seeks to preserve.  This case is
therefore entirely distinguishable from
cases such as Johns-Manville, where the
debtor faced “approximately 16,000
lawsuits pending as of the filing date,” with
the prospect of the “filing of an even more
staggering number of suits over the course
of 20-30 years,” 36 B.R. at 729, or The
Bible Speaks, where the debtor experienced
“two types of financial difficulty: a cash
flow problem which prevent[ed] it from
meeting its current obligations” and a
“staggering” claim that “may well exceed
the value of the Debtor’s assets” and that
“pose[d] a threat to the Debtor’s continued
existence,” 65 B.R. at 426.  See SGL
Carbon, 200 F.3d at 168-69 (discussing
these cases).6 
At the April 29 hearing, the
Bankruptcy Court suggested that the
bankruptcy process facilitated the
liquidation of the securities class action.
First, the Court reasoned that Chapter 11
“effectively reduced the recovery by the
securities law claimants by treating them
like shareholders pursuant to Section
510(b).”  We cannot find any evidence in
the record to support a finding that this
treatment forced the securities class to
accept the $25 million limit that the plan
places on their potential recovery.  Nor
could counsel for Integrated and the
OCESH support this finding when it was
raised at oral argument. 
Second, the Bankruptcy Court
observed that, “[i]n a non-bankruptcy law
context, the securities law plaintiffs would
have had a very strategic advantage,
namely so long as there was a possible
recovery against the corporation, the
liquidation would be stalled indefinitely.”
While the causal connection here may be
more compelling, we fail to see how this
observation distinguishes the securities
class from any other typical creditor, since
creditors often have strategic advantages
outside of bankruptcy that they lack inside
bankruptcy.   
Regardless, neither of the
Bankruptcy Cour t ’ s  observa tions
establishes that Integrated suffered
    6  We further note that, given the $105
million in cash held by Integrated and the
$20 million in D&O coverage, Integrated
would have remained solvent even if the
securities class and the Landlord were to
recover the full value of their claims ($93
million and $26 million, respectively). 
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financial distress, and neither supports a
finding that liquidation under Chapter 11
offered a reasonable chance of maximizing
the value available to satisfy all of the
parties with an interest in Integrated’s
estate.  Rather than pursuing a valid
bankruptcy purpose, these observations
suggest that Integrated filed for Chapter 11
in part to gain a litigation advantage over
the securities class, a use of Chapter 11 that
we emphatically rejected in SGL Carbon.
200 F.3d at 167 (holding that petition was
not filed in good faith where debtor’s sole
purpose was “to put pressure on [a
claimant] to accept the company's
settlement terms”). 
C.
Integrated argues that its petition
served three additional purposes that
support a finding of good faith.  As with
the securities class action, the Bankruptcy
Court did not specify which, if any, of
these asserted justifications had merit.  Our
own review of the record convinces us that
none of Integrated’s proffered justifications
warrant a finding of good faith.  
First, Integrated argues that Chapter
11 “provide[d] an efficient procedure for
the dissolution of Debtor and distribution
of its assets to parties in interest.”
Appellee’s Br. at 8.  In the same vein, the
OCESH argues that “[t]he Debtor’s
Chapter 11 filing was in good faith
[because] the debtor utilized the liquidation
provisions under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code for the proper purpose of
obtaining a quick, efficient, and orderly
winding down of the operations of its
failed business.”  OCESH Br. at 7.
Dissolution, however, is not an objective
that can be attained in bankruptcy.  Collier
on Bankruptcy § 727.01[3] (“After
liquidation, any dissolution of the
corporation or partnership that the parties
desire must be effectuated under state law,
since the Code does not provide for
d i s s o lu t i o n o f  co r p o r a t i o n s  o r
partnerships.”).  Nor is “distribution,”
standing alone, a valid bankruptcy
purpose.  Instead, the Bankruptcy Code
allows for a distribution of the debtor’s
estate pursuant to a valid plan of
reorganization or liquidation.  11 U.S.C. §
1123.  Antecedent to any such distribution
is an inquiry whether the petition and the
plan are filed in good faith, i.e., whether
they serve a valid bankruptcy purpose.
Neither Integrated nor the OCESH offer
any authority that the Code can be used to
effectuate a liquidation that has no hope of
maximizing the value of the company, 203
N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 453; Toibb, 501
U.S. at 163, but simply facilitates
dissolution on terms favorable to equity
interests.  Moreover, neither Integrated nor
the OCESH have identified any
efficiencies that were realized in this
bankruptcy that could not have been
realized under Delaware law.  
Second, Integrated argues that
Chapter 11 “provide[d] court oversight to
the proposed sale of its intellectual
property [as well as] certain protections to
the parties [to the sale] not available
outside of Chapter 11.”  Appellee’s Br. at
8.  Integrated’s intellectual property assets
consist of patents, trademarks, copyrights,
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and trade secrets related to the company’s
products and services.  There is no dispute
that the sale of these assets during the
bankruptcy realized an additional $1
million beyond the sale that Integrated had
negotiated prior to filing its Chapter 11
petition.  Under the circumstances of this
case, however, this fact hardly justifies
invocation of Chapter 11.  
For one, the increase in value was a
result of Integrated’s failure to adequately
market the assets to potential bidders
outside of the Board and management.7
When, on the very next day after it filed its
petition, Integrated moved to sell the assets
at auction without further marketing, the
OCESH challenged Integrated’s sale as an
improper exercise of business judgment.
True, the OCESH is “a creature of the
Bankruptcy Code,” Appellee’s Br. at 31,
and, but for Integrated’s petition, the
OCESH would not have existed.  But
surely Integrated did not need Chapter 11
to discover that a more open and
competitive auction might increase the
price obtained for its assets.  
Moreover, the increase in value was
relatively insignificant, representing less
than one percent of Integrated’s total
assets.  Integrated’s de minimis assets
(office equipment, inventory, etc.), by
comparison, totaled $500,000.  Further, the
net gain to Integrated’s estate must also
consider the fees paid from the estate to
the OCESH’s committee members,
attorneys, and professionals.  In the end,
this case is a far cry from PPI, where an
insolvent debtor used Chapter 11 to
increase the value of its sole asset by over
600 percent ($1.6 million to $11 million).
That bankruptcy allowed for an additional
$10 million to be paid to the creditors of
the debtors.  PPI, 324 F.3d at 201 & n.5. 
Finally, Integrated argues that
Chapter 11 “enable[d] the Debtor to
establish a bar date and define the universe
of claims against it to assure that any
distributions to its creditors and
stockholders account for any inchoate
claims.”  Appellee’s Br. at 8.   Essentially,
Integrated argues that, through the
OCESH, shareholders were able to
investigate potential claims and determine
that none existed.  The Bankruptcy Court
made no finding that Integrated was
subject to “inchoate” claims that needed to
be liquidated or barred, and Integrated’s
vague and passing references to potential
disputes with its shareholders is entirely
    7  Although Integrated suggests that the
increase in value was realized because
“the Bankruptcy Code afforded Debtor
and the buyer protections including the
ability to sell free and clear of liens and
claims, see section 363(f), and specific
evidentiary ‘good faith purchaser’
findings, see section 363(m),” Appellee’s
Br. at 30, the record provides no support
for this assertion.  For the most part, the
assets were sold to the same insiders with
whom Integrated had already negotiated a
sale prior to filing for Bankruptcy.  The
fact that these insiders were willing to
purchase the assets outside of bankruptcy
undercuts any argument that the
protections of the Code affected the
purchase price.
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insufficient to establish a good faith
expectation that Chapter 11 protection was
necessary to protect Integrated from such
claims.  
D.
Having determined that Integrated
was not in financial distress, and having
r e j e ct e d  I n t e g ra t e d ’ s  p o s t  h o c
rationalizations for filing under Chapter 11,
we turn to the OCESH’s argument that
Integrated’s desire to take advantage of the
cap on landlord claims provided by §
502(b)(6) establishes good faith in and of
itself.  Integrated makes a similar argument
when it states that its petition properly
sought “a favorable forum for the
consideration and resolution of other
disputed claims, including the Landlord’s
claim.”  Appellee’s Br. at 8.
The Bankruptcy Court did not hold
that Integrated’s desire to take advantage
of the § 502(b)(6) cap established good
faith.  Instead, the Bankruptcy Court held
that “it does not establish bad faith for a
debtor to file a chapter [11] case for the
purpose of taking advantage of provisions
which alter pre-petition rights, including
altering the rights of a landlord under State
law.”  (Emphasis added).  We agree.
Indeed, we believe it to be a truism that it
is not bad faith to seek to avail oneself of a
particular protection in the Bankruptcy
Code—Congress enacted such protections
with the expectation that they would be
used.  In re James Wilson Assocs., 965
F.2d 160, 170 (7th Cir. 1992) (“It is not
bad faith to seek to gain an advantage from
declaring bankruptcy—why else would one
declare it?”). 
The far more relevant question is
whether a desire to take advantage of a
particular provision in the Bankruptcy
Code, standing alone, establishes good
faith.8  We hold that it does not.  Just as a
desire to take advantage of the protections
of the Code cannot establish bad faith as a
matter of law, that desire cannot establish
good faith as a matter of law.  Given the
truism that every bankruptcy petition seeks
some advantage offered in the Code, any
other rule would eviscerate any limitation
that the good faith requirement places on
Chapter 11 filings. 
At least one Bankruptcy Court has
dismissed for a lack of good faith a
Chapter 11 petition seeking primarily to
cap a landlord’s claim for future rent under
§ 502(b)(6), In re Liberate Technologies,
No. 04-31394-TC, 2004 WL 2008956, at
*7-*8 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2004),
and other Bankruptcy Courts have
similarly dismissed Chapter 11 petitions
filed merely to take advantage of other
    8  The law is clear that the burden is on
the bankruptcy petitioner to establish that
its petition has been filed in good faith. 
PPI, 324 F.3d at 211; SGL Carbon, 200
F.3d at 162 n.10. The Bankruptcy
Court’s statements that “it does not
establish bad faith for a debtor to,” or “I
conclude that as a matter of law, that is
not a debilitating fact,” erroneously
suggest that the question before the court
was whether bad faith, rather than good
faith, had been proven.  
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singular provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code.  See N.W. Place, Ltd. v. Cooper (In
re N.W. Place, Ltd.), 73 B.R. 978, 982
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1987) (Chapter 11
petition filed to invoke trustee’s avoidance
powers under Bankruptcy Code and to set
aside transfer); In re S. Cal. Sound Sys.,
Inc., 69 B.R. 893, 900 (Bankr. S.D. Cal.
1987) (Chapter 11 petition filed to reject
executory contract pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §
365(a)); In re Cardi Ventures, Inc., 59 B.R.
18, 22-23 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) (Chapter
11 petition filed to assume and assign lease
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 365(f)); In re
Nancant, Inc., 8 B.R. 1005, 1008 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 1981) (Chapter 11 petition filed
to have certain tax liability determined
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 505).  For
example, 11 U.S.C. § 362 protects debtors
by staying litigation against them during
the pendency of the bankruptcy.  Yet courts
universally demand more of Chapter 11
petitions than a naked desire to stay
pending litigation.  E.g., Dixie Broad., 871
F.2d at 1026-27.  As one Bankruptcy Court
put it:
The protection of the
automatic stay is not per se a
valid justification for a
Chapter 11 filing; rather, it is
a consequential benefit of an
otherwise good faith filing.
A perceived need for the
automatic stay, without
more, cannot convert a bad
faith filing to a good faith
one.
In re HBA East, Inc., 87 B.R. 248, 262
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988).  Indeed, if there
is a “classic” bad faith petition, it may be
one in which the petitioner’s only goal is
to use the automatic stay provision to
avoid posting an appeal bond in another
court.  E.g., Marsch, 36 F.3d at 828.  
Integrated and the OCESH may
therefore be correct that § 502(b)(6)
reflects a Congressional determination that
landlords stand to receive a windfall in a
bankruptcy, and that landlord claims are
inherently speculative.  Furthermore,
Integrated and the OCESH may be correct
that § 502(b)(6) should operate to cap
landlord claims, even where the only effect
of the cap would be to transfer assets from
creditors to equity holders.9  Yet §
502(b)(6) and the legislative policy
underlying that provision assume the
existence of a valid bankruptcy, which, in
turn, assumes a debtor in financial distress.
The question of good faith is therefore
antecedent to the operation of § 502(b)(6).
Although the Bankruptcy Code
contains many provisions that have the
effect of redistributing value from one
interest group to an other, these
redistributions are not the Code’s purpose.
Instead, the purposes of the Code are to
preserve going concerns and to maximize
the value of the debtor’s estate.  203 N.
LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 453; Toibb, 501 U.S.
at 163-64.  Section 502(b)(6) is precisely
    9  The Landlord and Amici vigorously
argue that § 502(b)(6) does not apply to a
solvent debtor.
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the sort of provision this Court had in mind
when we stated:
It is easy to see why courts
have required Chapter 11
petitioners to act within the
scope of the bankruptcy laws
t o  f u r t h e r  a  v a l i d
reorganizational purpose.
Chapter 11 vests petitioners
w i t h  c o n s i d e r a b l e
powers—the automatic stay,
the exclusive right to
propose a reorganization
plan, the discharge of debts,
etc.— that can impose
significant hardship on
particular creditors.  When
f i n a n c i a l l y  t r o u b l e d
petitioners seek a chance to
remain in business, the
exercise of those powers is
justified.  But this is not so
when a petitioner’s aims lie
outs ide  those of  th e
Bankruptcy Code.
SGL Carbon, 200 F.3d at 165 (emphasis
added).  To be filed in good faith, a petition
must do more than merely invoke some
dis tr ibu tiona l mechanism  in the
Bankruptcy Code.  It must seek to create or
preserve some value that would otherwise
be lost—not merely distributed to a
d i f fe ren t s takehold er—outs ide  of
bankruptcy.  This threshold inquiry is
particularly sensitive where, as here, the
petition seeks to distribute value directly
from a creditor to a company’s
shareholders.  See In re Telegroup Inc.,
281 F.3d 133, 140 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting
Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54
U. Chi. L. Rev. 775, 792 (1987), for the
proposition that “[a]n almost axiomatic
principle of business law is that, because
equity owners stand to gain the most when
a business succeeds, they should absorb
the costs of the business’s collapse—up to
the full amount of their investment”); see
also 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 453
(characterizing one of the purposes of
Chapter 11 as “maximizing property
available to satisfy creditors”).  
As we have explained above, in a
smoking gun resolution approved by the
Board, and notwithstanding its strong
financial position, Integrated authorized a
letter to the Landlord threatening that if it
did not enter into a settlement of the lease
in the amount of at least $8 million,
Integrated would file for bankruptcy so as
to take advantage of § 502(b)(6), which
sharply limits the amount that a landlord
can recover in bankruptcy for damages
resulting from the termination of a lease. 
Taken to its logical conclusion, the
OCESH’s argument is that any entity
willing to undergo Chapter 11 proceedings
may cap the claims of its landlord.
Nothing in the Bankruptcy Code or its
legislative history suggests that §
502(b)(6) was meant to allow tenants to
avoid their leases whenever the landlord’s
state law remedy exceeds the cap under §
502(b)(6) by an amount greater than the
cost of proceeding through a Chapter 11
reorganization or liquidation.  Such a rule
would not only obviate the need for a good
faith requirement, but would be
antithetical to the structure and purposes of
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the Bankruptcy Code. 
III.
We hold that both the District Court
and the Bankruptcy Court erred as a matter
of law in concluding that Integrated
suffered financial distress.  Although
Integrated’s business model had failed, the
company had no significant debt apart from
the Landlord’s claim.  Moreover, the
record demonstrates that the securities
class action did not present a significant
threat to Integrated’s finances.  Because
Integrated was not in financial distress, its
Chapter 11 petition was not filed in good
faith  as it cou ld no t— and did
not—preserve any value for Integrated’s
creditors that would have been lost outside
of bankruptcy.  We will therefore reverse
the order of the District Court affirming the
Bankruptcy Court’s denial of the
Landlord’s motion to dismiss, and will
remand this case to the Bankruptcy Court
with instructions to dismiss Integrated’s
petition.  
